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CITIZENSHIP, ALIENAGE, AND ETHNIC ORIGIN
DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT UNDER THE LAW OF
THE UNITED STATES
Mack A. Player*
The Lord spoke to Moses and said, . . When an alien settles with
you in your land, you shall not oppress him. He shall be treated
as a native born among you, and you shall love him as a man like
yourself ....
Leviticus 19:33 (New English Bible)
I. INTRODUCTION
This paper will survey the federal law of discrimination in em-
ployment based on ethnic origin, alienage, and citizenship.' There
are a number of sources of this law, many of them overlapping. The
federal constitution provides some protections, but only to govern-
mental employees or applicants. The traditional centerpiece of em-
ployment discrimination law is Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964.2 The 1866 Civil Rights Act 3 also provides protection which
overlaps with that provided by Title VII. Finally, the recently enacted
* Professor of Law, Florida State University College of Law; A.B. 1962 Drury
College; J.D., 1965 University of Missouri; LL.M., 1972 George Washington Uni-
versity.
I Only the federal, or national, law will be addressed. State and local law may
well address similar issues. By virtue of federal law supremacy, (U.S. Const. art.
VI) state and local law may not undercut or authorize any action proscribed by
federal law. Rosenfeld v. Southern Pac. Co., 444 F.2d 1219 (9th Cir. 1971). See
also Johnson v. Mayor & City Council of Baltimore, 472 U.S. 353 (1985). However,
so long as state and local statutes or common law developments do not conflict
with established federal policies, such as prohibiting that which federal law desires
to specifically authorize, state and local law can parallel or even exceed federal law
in protecting civil rights. See California Federal Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Guerra, 474
U.S. 1049 (1987). Frequently, discrimination proscribed by federal law may also
violate state or local law, with remedies existing under the law of both jurisdictions.
Moreover, it is possible that some forms of discrimination may receive more pro-
tection under state law than federal law, and may have a remedy not available under
federal law.
2 78 Stat. 253,42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2000e-17 (1982).
3 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1986).
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Immigration Reform and Control Act of 19864 regulates both national
origin discrimination, thus duplicating the protections of Title VII,
and citizenship discrimination which received incomplete attention in
the other statutory schemes.
This paper will survey each of these sources of protection. Despite
all of these overlapping statutory protections, serious gaps still exist,
particularly with respect to discrimination against aliens based on
lack of citizenship.
II. THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION
A. "State Action" and the Analytical Model
It is axiomatic that the Constitution of the United States defines
and limits the powers of governments; it does not regulate acts of
purely private persons, individual or corporate.' The Fifth Amend-
ment, one of the original Bill of Rights, prohibits the federal gov-
ernment from depriving persons of "life, liberty, or property without
due process of law." The Fourteenth Amendment, which was a
product of the post-Civil War Reconstruction, limits the powers of
the States by providing that no State shall "deprive any person of
life, liberty or property without due process of law, nor deny to any
person within its jurisdiction the equal protections of the laws." '6
This language clearly indicates that these protections are not limited
to citizens or residents of the States or of the United States, but are
accorded to "any person." Even those who have entered the United
States illegally can claim the protections of the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments . 7
4 Pub. L. No. 99-603, 78 Stat. 253 (1986) (codified as amended in various
sections of 8 U.S.C.).
I The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883); Lugar v. Edmonson Oil Co., 457
U.S. 922 (1982); Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345 (1974).
6 The Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments share common "due process" language.
The Fifth Amendment does not, however, contain language found in the Fourteenth
Amendment which requires states to provide "equal protection of the laws," and
the Fourteenth Amendment does not restrict the powers of the Federal government.
Nonetheless, "due process" contains an "equal protection" component in that state
action which would deny a person "equal protection of the laws" will probably
(but not always) violate that person's right to "due process of law" and thus be
protected against federal action. For example, racial segregation of schools by states
infringes the right to equal protection of the laws; similar racial segregation by the
federal government is a denial of due process of law. See Boiling v. Sharpe, 347
U.S. 497 (1954); Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67 (1976).
1 Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982). See also Shaughnessy v. United States ex
rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206 (1953); Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228, 238
(1896); Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 369 (1886).
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Simply because aliens are protected by the Constitution does not
mean that the Constitution prohibits all governmental discrimination
against aliens. "Due process of law" and "equal protection of the
laws" under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments do not necessarily
prohibit legislative or executive action restricting governmental em-
ployment of aliens. Determining the extent to which governments are
limited in their employment practices requires a multi-step analysis,
and to those not familiar with the American constitutional system,
it may seem to be an unduly complex analysis."
The concept of "equal protection of the laws" has led the Supreme
-Court to conclude that governmental classifications that discriminate
against so-called "suspect classes" are subject to strict and searching
judicial scrutiny, and the classification will be declared unconstitu-
tional if the government cannot demonstrate compelling reasons for
them. 9 On the other hand, governmental classifications that utilize
non-suspect distinctions, such as those drawn in ordinary economic,
tax, or social legislation, will be sustained unless the person chal-
lenging them can demonstrate the total irrationality or arbitrariness
of the governmental action, a very heavy and usually impossible
burden for a plaintiff to carry.' 0 The analytical watershed therefore
becomes one of identifying whether the governmental classification
is "suspect."
B. Race and Ethnic Origin as "Suspect Classes"
Race, of course, was the first and most easily identified suspect
classification requiring proof of compelling justifications for its use.
I Government employment is no longer considered a "privilege" which may be
granted or withheld at will without being subject to constitutional scrutiny. Pickering
v. Board of Educ. 391 U.S. 563 (1968). Compare McAulifee v. New Bedford, 155
Mass. 216, 220, 29 N.E. 517-18 (1892), where in sustaining the discharge of a
policeman without any analysis of possible constitutional issues, Justice Holmes, in
famous dicta stated, "The petitioner may have a constitutional right to talk politics,
but he has no constitutional right to be a policeman." While no abstract "right"
to public employment exists, that employment, like any other governmental action,
may not be allocated along grounds that violate precepts of equal protection of the
laws. Thus, an employee does not waive constitutional protections by becoming an
employee. But, the government may have valid interests as an employer that would
permit it to deny employment for conduct for which it could not constitutionally
punish a non-employee. Compare Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 1056 (1987), with
Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138 (1983).
9 Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971); Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ.,
476 U.S. 267 (1986).
10 Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307 (1976).
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Aside from the use of narrowly defined affirmative action plans
designed to remedy identified racial segregation or to rectify "con-
spicuous racial imbalances in traditionally segregated job categories,"
the use of race by governmental employers in the hire, promotion,
or discharge of workers will violate the Fifth Amendment (in the
case of the Federal government) or Fourteenth Amendment (in the
case of State or local governmental units)."
The Supreme Court similarly identified ethnic origin as a suspect
classification. Like race, an ethnic origin classification required the
government to establish compelling reasons for its use. It is virtually
impossible for a government to establish a compelling interest in
discriminating against ethnic minorities, such as Hispanics, Irish-
Americans, Italian-Americans, or Polish-Americans. 2 However, as in
the case of racial classifications, a governmental employer may adopt
reasonable affirmative action plans based on ethnic background, pro-
vided that such plans affirmative action plans based on ethnic back-
ground, provided that such plans are designed only to increase the
employment of ethnic groups who have been victimized by discrim-
ination. For example, a government may attempt to increase the
employment of Hispanics if past actions have resulted in significant
underemployment of that ethnic class. It may establish a goal of
having in each relevant job category a percentage of Hispanic em-
ployees similar to the percentage of qualified Hispanic persons in the
relevant work-force population. It may utilize Hispanic origin in
making individualized decisions, or even employ hiring ratios for
qualified Hispanic workers. While such affirmative action plans utilize
Anglo-American ethnic origin as a negative factor, they will pass
constitutional muster as long as they are narrowly drawn, are remedial
in character, and do not unduly trammel the rights of the majority.
Such plans meet the standard of serving the compelling governmental
interest of eradicating past segregation and discrimination. And while
affirmative action plans can justify use of ethnic heritage in making
hiring and promotion decisions to remedy historical discrimination,
such plans cannot justify use of race or ethnicity in making termi-
nation decisions.' 3
Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978); Wygant
v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267 (1986).
12 Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475, 477-79 (1954); Keyes v. School Dist. No.
1, 413 U.S. 189, 197 (1973).
11 See United Steelworkers of America v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979); Wygant
v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267 (1986); Johnson v. Santa Clara County
Transp. Agency, 480 U.S. 616 (1987).
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C. Citizenship and Alienage
Classifications distinguishing citizens from non-citizens, or alienage
classifications, have been categorized as "suspect" and, at least the-
oretically, are subject to the same searching scrutiny as are racial
and ethnic distinctions. 4 In reality, however, citizenship requirements
for employment have not been subjected to the searching scrutiny
given racial and ethnic classifications.
The federal government continues to require American citizenship
as a qualification for federal civil service employment. 5 The citizen-
ship qualification has been sustained under the strict scrutiny standard
of the Fifth Amendment based on the unique interests of the federal
government in regulating immigration and conducting foreign af-
fairs. 16 At most, such justifications seem remote and speculative,
significantly short of what one normally considers to be "compelling."
Perhaps such decisions can be justified in terms of traditional judicial
deference to constitutionally co-equal branches of government, par-
ticularly as to matters, such as citizenship and foreign affairs, which
are constitutionally delegated to the political branches. 7
State and local requirements of citizenship for governmental em-
ployment are subject to an even greater degree of complexity. The
exclusion of aliens from all civil service employment is said to be a
suspect rule subject to strict scrutiny under the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. In applying that high level of scrutiny the Court has invalidated
blanket requirements that ordinary state civil servants be American
citizens.18 Such a requirement was deemed to be overly broad and,
unlike the similar requirement in the federal civil service, served no
significant governmental interest.
Subsequently, however, the Court recognized that certain state
officers "participate directly in the formation, execution, or review
of broad public policy" or "perform functions that go to the heart
of representative government."' 9 A citizenship requirement for those
'4 Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971).
" 5 C.F.R. § 7.4 (1988). See also Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S. 88
(1977).
16 Mow Sun Wong v. Campbell, 626 F.2d 739 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, Lum
v. Campbell, 450 U.S. 959 (1981). See Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S. 88
(1976).
11 See Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448 (1980); United States v. Curtiss-Wright
Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 320 (1936); Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1, 17 (1965).
"1 Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634 (1973).
19 Foley v. Connelie, 435 U.S. 291 (1978).
1990]
GA. J. INT'L & Comp. L.
higher level or policy making officials is not deemed to be "suspect. ,20
Since such a citizenship requirement for these higher officials is not
subject to strict scrutiny, the requirement need only be rational to
be deemed constitutional.
The problem then becomes one of identifying which offices qualify
for the mere rationality level of scrutiny. If the job is deemed one
of an ordinary lower-level civil servant, a citizenship requirement will
be presumptively unconstitutional. Presumably, American citizenship
cannot be required of clerical workers, manual laborers, transpor-
tation employees, or even professionals who do not implement public
policy.2' On the other hand, police officers22 and school teachers23
fall within the "public policy" level of employment for which citi-
zenship credentials can be imposed.
D. A Note on Motive and Impact Under the Constitution.
In determining the level of scrutiny to be applied, the courts will
first evaluate whether an express classification appears on the face
of a statute or regulation or as part of a clearly admitted official
policy. If so, the burden will be on the government to establish the
compelling governmental interests served by the classification. 24 If
there is no express classification, the question will be whether ad-
ministrators were motivated by "suspect" considerations which are
subject to heightened judicial scrutiny. 25 Only if the plaintiff proves
that the defendant was motivated by such class considerations will
the defendant have to carry the burden of establishing the compelling
reasons for use of the suspect class. Absent proof that the action
did in fact have such suspect motivations, the courts will analyze the
2 Id.
2, Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634, 643 (1973) (state civil service law requiring
inter alia citizenship for sanitation workers, typists, and clerical positions violates
equal protection since it sweeps indiscriminately and is not narrowly limited to
accomplishment of substantial state interests). Cf. Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33
(1915). Contrast In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717 (1973); Examining Board of Engineers,
Architects & Surveyors v. Flores de Otero, 426 U.S. 572 (1976)(state could not
exclude aliens from being licensed into professions).
22 Foley v. Connelie, 435 U.S. 291 (1978); Cabell v. Chavez-Salido, 454 U.S. 432
(1982).
23 Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68 (1979).
24 See, e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
23 Arlington Heights.v Metropolitan Housing Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977); Hunter
v. Underwood, 471 U.S. 222 (1985).
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classification as a traditional governmental decision which will be
unconstitutional only if proved to be unreasonable. 26
A classification is not entitled to special, heightened judicial scrutiny
simply because it has an adverse impact on a protected class. Thus,
even though a selection device, such as a test given in the English
language, might adversely affect the employment of persons based
on their citizenship or ethnic heritage, absent a specific intent on the
part of the employer to secure a discriminatory result, the device will
be unconstitutional only if the plaintiff proves that the device is
unreasonable.
27
III. TITLE VII OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964
A. A General Look at the Statute
The Civil Rights Act of 1964 was a multi-title statute prohibiting
various forms of invidious discrimination in many areas of the na-
tional life: voting, education, use of public facilities, and, in Title
VII of the Act, employment. Generally stated, Title VII prohibits
employers, labor organizations, and employment agencies from dis-
criminating on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, and national
origin in any aspect of the employment relationship, including, hire,
promotion, discharge, compensation, and all other terms and con-
ditions of employment. 2 It applies to private employers and state
26 Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307 (1976); Geduldig v.
Aiello, 417 U.S. 484 (1974).
27 Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976)(An objective test adversely affecting
black applicants is not "suspect" and thus subject to scrict scrutiny merely because
of that impact. To invoke strict scrutiny a plaintiff would have to prove improper
motive in use of the test). Personnel Administrator of Massachusetts v. Feeney, 442
U.S. 256 (1979)(A statutory preference for veterans had a devastating impact on
the employment of women in the state civil service. Even though the legislature was
aware of this impact in enacting the statute, this was still insufficient to prove that
the legislature was motivated by considerations of gender.)
z, Section 703(a) of Title VII provides:
(a) It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer -
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise
discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms,
conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin; or
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employment
in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of
employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an
employee, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1982).
Sections 703(b) and (c) similarly restrict employment agencies and labor organi-
zations. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(b) and § 2000e-2(c).
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and local government entities which have fifteen or more employees. 29
The non-discrimination provisions are also applicable to all employ-
ment actions taken by the federal executive branch. 0
B. Motive and Impact
Title VII jurisprudence has established two models for finding
liability: (1) treatment motivated by membership in one of the classes
protected by the Act (race, color, religion, sex, or national origin),"'
and (2) use of factors which have an unjustified adverse impact on
a class protected by the Act. 2 Of course, proof of a discriminatory
motive will establish a violation of the Act, except in those cases
where national origin is a "bona fide occupational qualification rea-
sonably necessary to the normal operation of that particular busi-
ness."3 3 Or, in the event that the employer had a valid reason for
its treatment of the plaintiff, coupled with the motive made illegal
29 42 U.S.C § 2000e(b) (1982) defines "employer" to include "person", but
exclude federal agencies. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(a) defines "person" to include "gov-
ernments and government agencies, political subdivisions." Excluded from the def-
inition of "employee" are personnel who are on the staff of elected officials or
who hold high, policy-making positions. Thus, discrimination against persons holding,
seeking, or being removed from such positions does not involve an "employment"
decision subject to Title VII scrutiny. See Rogero v. Noone, 704 F.2d 518 (lth
Cir. 1983); Teneyuca v. Bexar County, 767 F.2d 148 (5th Cir. 1985). For a description
of Title VII coverage see Player, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW, Sec. 5.06-.16
(1988).
30 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16 (1982).
11 See e.g., Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 109 S.Ct. 1775 (1989).
32 Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971); Watson v. Fort Worth Bank
& Trust Co., 487 U.S. 977 (1988); Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 109 S.Ct.
2115 (1989).
33 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e)(l) (1982). See Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 109 S.
Ct. 1775 (1989). The bona fide occupational qualification (BFOQ) defense is strictly
construed and rarely successful. It requires proof that all or substantially all persons
of the excluded class could not safely and effectively perform the essence of the
job. See Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321 (1977). See generally, Player, supra
note 29, sec. 529. The legislative history of Title VII indicates that ethnic atmosphere,
entertainment, or authenticity in dramatic productions, modeling, or eating estab-
lishments might justify a preference for particular national origins. 110 Cong. Rec.
2549. Otherwise, it is difficult to envision a situation where all or substantially all
persons of any particular ethnic or national origin could not perform. Cf. Kern v.
Dynalectron Corp. 577 F.Supp. 1196 (N.D.Tex. 1983), affd 746 F.2d 810 (5th Cir.
1984). However, nationality may be a bona fide occupational qualification for high
level executives of a foreign company doing business in the United States, based on
the need for the executives to be conversant with the customs of the nation of the
parent company. See Avigliano v. Sumitomo Shoji America, Inc., 638 F.2d 552 (2d
Cir. 1981), rev'd on other grounds, 457 U.S. 176 (1982).
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by Title VII, "defendant may avoid a finding of liability only by
proving by a preponderance of the evidence that it would have made
the same decision even if it had not taken the plaintiff's [class
membership] into account." 3 4
Proof of discriminatory motive is not required under a disparate
impact theory. The plaintiff first has the burden of proving that an
ostensibly neutral factor adversely affects the employment opportu-
nities of those of a particular race, gender, or national origin. 5
Assuming the plaintiff proves the exclusionary effect, the employer
has the "burden of producing evidence of a business justification for
his employment practice."
'3 6
The touchstone of this inquiry is a reasoned review of the employer's
justification for his use of the challenged practice. A mere insub-
stantial justification in this regard will not suffice ..... .At the
same time there is no requirement that the challenged practice be
'essential' or 'indispensable' to the employer's business . . .37
If the defendant presents evidence of a "substantial justification"
for the use of the device proved to adversely affect the plaintiff's
class, and the plaintiff "cannot persuade the trier of fact on the
question of [defendant's] business necessity defense, [plaintiff] may
still be able to prevail . . ."
To do so [plaintiff] will have to persuade the factfinder that "other
tests of selection devices, without a similarly undesirable racial effect,
would also serve the employer's legitimate hiring interests;" by so
demonstrating, respondents would prove that "petitioners were using
their tests merely as a pretext for discrimination.'"'3
Impact analysis can thus be used to protect against effective national
origin discrimination through the use of ostensibly neutral devices
without having to carry the difficult burden of proving the employer's
14 Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 109 S.Ct. 1775 (1989).
35 Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440 (1982); New York City Transit Authority,
v. Beazer, 440 U.S. 568 (1979); Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 109 S.Ct. 2115
(1989).
36 Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 109 S.Ct. 2115, 2126 (1989).
17 Id. at 2126.
38 Id., at 2126. See also, Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust Co., 487 U.S.
977 (1988). Atonio and Watson resulted in a dramatic alteration of the understanding
of impact analysis from the perspective of who carries the burden of persuasion
and the weight of that burden in terms of what was meant by "business necessity."
For a pre-Watson and a pre-Atonio discussion of impact analysis see Player, supra
note 29, at sec. 5.41.
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national origin motivation. For example, a test that measures facility
with the English language might be shown to disproportionately
disqualify certain ethnic groups, particularly those whose heritage is
non-English speaking. In such a case, the employer will have an initial
obligation to present a business reason for the test. At this point,
the plaintiff will have to convince the factfinder that the reason
proffered by the employer either is not substantial, or that reasonable
alternatives to the English test exist. Another example would be an
employer who utilized a minimum height requirement, with the effect
of disqualifying a disproportionately high number of persons from
certain racial or ethnic groups. The employer would have to present
evidence of a business reason for such a physical requirement. If the
employer meets this burden, the plaintiff, to prevail, must demonstrate
that the height requirement lacked any substance, or that reasonable,
less discriminatory alternatives exist.
C. National Origin: Generally
The face of Title VII proscribes discrimination based on "national
origin". Congress considered this somewhat ambiguous term to mean
"the country from which you or your forebears came." A rough
equivalent might be "ancestry." 3 9 Thus, it violates the Act to dis-
criminate against so-called hyphenated Americans such as Italian-
Americans, Polish-Americans, Mexican-Americans, and Irish-Amer-
icansA0 It is also unlawful to discriminate against a person because
of his Anglo-American heritage. In Puerto Rico, a Commonwealth
subject to United States law, an employer who discriminates against
mainland "Americanos" is engaged in proscribed national origin
discrimination . 4 '
It is national origin discrimination to make distinctions based on
the name or surname of an employee or applicant, regardless of the
actual ancestry of the individual. Thus, discriminating against one
with an Hispanic or middle-eastern sounding name is illegal. 42 Sim-
ilarly, discrimination on the basis of the perceived origins of the
spouse or associates of an applicant or an employee is national origin
19 110 Cong. Rec. 2549 (1964); H.R.Rep. No. 914, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 87
(1963).
40 Cariddi v. Kansas City Chiefs Football Club, Inc., 568 F.2d 87 (8th Cir. 1977);
Berke v. Ohio Dep't of Pub. Welfare, 628 F.2d 980 (6th Cir. 1980).
41 Earnhardt v. Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, 744 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1984).
42 EEOC v. Safeway Stores, 611 F.2d 795 (10th Cir. 1979).
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discrimination, even though the employer has no animus towards the
origin of the employee or applicant.4 3
Discrimination because of the "foreign" appearance of an indi-
vidual would be based on "color" as well as national origin. An
employer cannot discriminate against an applicant because he speaks
with a "foreign" sounding accent, or because the person speaks a
foreign language and, thus, is presumed to be "foreign.""
D. Language Requirements as National Origin Discrimination: An
Application of Impact Analysis
A requirement that employees be able to speak and understand the
English language is not national origin discrimination on its face.45
The employer is not necessarily excluding a person based on that
person's national origin, but is discriminating on the basis of an
objective fact of language competency. Obviously, however, the re-
quirement, similar to that of a test using the English language to
measure performance," adversly affects the protected class of those
who come from non-English-speaking nations. Nonetheless, fluency
in English would be, for the English-speaking employer, a justified
"business necessity." 47
A requirement that employees be fluent in a language other than
English, assuming it was imposed in good faith and not for the
purpose of favoring a particular national origin, would no doubt
adversely affect employment opportunities of the predominately mon-
olingual Anglo-Americans. If that language requirement is related to
a bona fide need of the employer, such as an ability to speak with
customers, it would be considered a "business necessity" and sus-
tained. 48 On the other hand, if the language requirement had no
business purpose, it would be invalid given its adverse impact on
those of Anglo heritage.
41 See Parr v. Woodmen of the World Life Ins. Co., 791 F.2d 888 (11th Cir.
1986).
" Berke v. Ohio Dep't of Pub. Welfare, 628 F.2d 980 (6th Cir. 1980); Carino
v. Univ. of Okla. Bd. of Regents, 750 F.2d 815 (10th Cir. 1984).
' Frontera v. Sindell, 522 F.2d 1215 (6th Cir. 1975); Garcia v. Gloor, 618 F.2d
264 (5th Cir. 1980).
46 See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
41 Vasquez v. McAllen Bag & Supply Co., 660 F.2d 686 (5th Cir. 1981); Stephen
v. PGA Sheraton Resorts, Ltd., 873 F.2d 276, 280 (11th Cir. 1989); Fraganta v.
City of Honolulu, 888 F.2d 591, 598 (9th Cir. 1989).
48 See Smith v. District of Columbia, 29 FEP Cases (BNA) 1129, 1133 (D.D.C.
1982).
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Some employers have prohibited the use of any language other
than English during working hours. It may be difficult to prove the
adverse impact of a rule requiring English to be spoken at all times.4 9
Absent proof of impact, and assuming the employer's good faith,
such a rule cannot violate Title VII.
Some authority has indicated, however, that adverse impact may
lie presumptively in the insult to and humiliation of persons of non-
Anglo heritage when they are denied the use of their native, and
most natural, tongue.50 In the alternative, such a blanket rule might
be considered a form of express national origin classification, to be
justified only by proof that the rule is a bona fide occupational
qualification." If such a rule is considered a form of express national
origin discrimination, the defendant may have difficulty proving that
it serves a significant business purpose.
E. Alienage or Non-Citizenship
Title VII clearly covers or protects non-citizens against discrimi-
nation proscribed by the Act.52 Thus, an alien who is a victim of
,9 See Garcia v. Gloor, 618 F.2d 264 (5th Cir. 1980). The plaintiff may be able
to prove such impact by showing that when invoked it fell solely, or disproportionately
upon those of a particular ethnic heritage. See Yuhas v. Libbey-Owens-Ford Co.,
562 F.2d 496 (7th Cir. 1977); EEOC v. Rath Packing Co., 787 F.2d 318 (8th Cir.
1986), where an employer's actual result in the retirements forced by a no-spouse
rule was sufficient to allow a finding that such a rule adversely affected women
employees. Cf. Harper v. Trans World Airlines, 525 F.2d 409 (8th Cir. 1975), where
an employer's experience with a similar rule was insufficient to prove its adverse
impact.
10 Gutierrez v. Municipal Court, County of Los Angeles, 838 F.2d 1031 (9th Cir.
1988), vacated as moot, 109 S.Ct 1736 (1989). Even if such impact is proved, the
employer's reasons for its use may be legitimate. While Gutierrez indicated that no
showing of "business necessity" was needed, given the Court's revisiting of the
"business necessity" burden, (see supra notes 35-38 and accompanying text) it may
be difficult for plaintiffs to prove the lack of any substance to such a rule. Clearly,
if an employer has a reason for an "English only" rule, it will be sustained. See
Jurado v. Eleven-Fifty Corp., 813 F.2d 1406 (9th Cir. 1987) (on air use of Spanish
by announcer could be prohibited). But see, Karst, Paths to Belonging: The Con-
stitutional and Cultural Identity, 64 N.C.L. REv. 303 (1986) (language and its use
is a part of one's ethnicity deserving special legal protection).
" Id. See also, 29 C.F.R. § 1606.7(a) (1988). See Comment, Language Discrim-
ination Under Title VII: The Silent Right of National Origin Discrimination, 15 J.
MARSHALL L. REv. 667 (1982).
52 Section 703(a)-(d) (42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2(a)-2000e-17 (1982) makes it unlawful
"to discriminate against any individual", or classify "employees or applicants".
Clearly, a non-citizen is an "individual", and can qualify as an "employee" or
"applicant". See Espinoza v. Farah Mfg. Co., 414 U.S. 86 (1973). Moreover, Section
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sex discrimination, race discrimination, religious discrimination, or
discrimination because of ethnic origin has a claim under the Act.
However, Title VII does not expressly proscribe discrimination based
on citizenship or alienage. Nor does the protection against "national
origin" discrimination necessarily encompass discrimination based on
"nationality." It was argued before the Supreme Court that when
an employer rejected an individual because of her lack of United
States citizenship, or alienage, it was necessarily-a rejection based on
the national origin of the person." Citizenship and national origin
were alleged to be based on the same concept, namely, where the
person or his parents were born.
In Espinoza v. Farah Mfg. Co.,14 the Supreme Court rejected that
argument and held that alienage and national origin are distinct
concepts. The Court found that Congress intended to allow employers
to demand American citizenship as a condition of employment. This
perceived intent was based in large part on legislation involving federal
employment where discrimination on the basis of ethnic origin or
ancestry was clearly prohibited, but American citizenship had long
been required. That distinction was presumably intended by Congress
when it used the term "national origin". Given this narrow con-
struction of "national origin," perhaps a better, more descriptive
term for discrimination proscribed by Title VII is "ethnic origin."
While Title VII permits discrimination against all aliens, it does
not permit discrimination between aliens based on the nation or region
of their citizenship. Therefore, an employer who hired Canadian
nationals but refused to hire Mexican nationals would be making a
proscribed national origin distinction. A citizenship requirement, per-
missible in itself, may not be drawn along ethnic origin lines. Similarly,
an employer who hired Canadians without regard to education, but
702 (42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1) provides that "this title shall not apply to any employer
with respect to the employment of aliens outside any State." First, this precludes
Title VII from having extraterritorial application, at least as to decisions made on
foreign soil. See Bryant v. International School Services, Inc., 502 F.Supp. 472
(D.N.J. 1980), rev'd on other grounds, 675 F.2d 562 (3d Cir. 1982) (Title VII does
reach decisions made in the United States even though services are to be performed
extraterritorialy). Compare, Section 4(h) of the Age Discrimination in Employment
Act (29 U.S.C. § 623(h) (Supp. IV 1986)) which has considerable extraterritorial
application to American companies doing business abroad. Second, this specific
exclusion of the protection of aliens employed abroad confirms that aliens employed
in the United States are protected by Title VII.
11 Espinoza v. Farah Mfg. Co., 414 U.S. 86 (1973).
54 Id.
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required Mexican aliens to have a college degree would be in violation
of Title VII.11
F. Citizenship Distinguished from Alienage: Discrimination
Against U.S. Nationals
A significant and largely unresolved question is whether a foreign
employer operating in the United States may discriminate against
United States citizens on the basis of their citizenship. For example,
may a Japanese company doing business in the United States prefer
Japanese nationals to the exclusion of Americans? A quick, and
perhaps superficial, conclusion might be that since Title VII does not
equate national origin with citizenship, an employer may refuse to
hire American nationals, so long as the distinction is based upon
citizenship, and not upon ethnic or national origin.
The conclusion that any employer may use citizenship as a valid
factor does not necessarily follow from the Supreme Court's con-
clusion that an American company may discriminate in favor of
United States nationals. The fact that Title VII allows an employer
to discriminate against aliens does not necessarily mean that the law
sanctions broad use of any citizenship requirement. The legislative
history of Title VII emphasizes the fact that a company in the United
States should be allowed to exclude all "aliens," distinguishing be-
tween alienage and origin. This critical legislative history did not
sanction discrimination against United States citizens on the basis of
their United States citizenship. Thus, a valid distinction could be
made between alienage discrimination, which Congress was presumed
to have permitted, and other forms of citizenship discrimination which
Congress had no desire to permit. Indeed, it is almost inconceivable
that the United States Congress intended to allow foreign companies
to prefer foreign nationals to American citizens without violating the
prohibitions against national origin discrimination. 6
" Id. at 92 n.5, 95. See also Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp., 400 U.S. 542
(1971).
56 See 110 Cong. Rec. 2549 and 7213 (1964). See also Linskey v. Heidelberg
Eastern, Inc., 470 F.Supp. 1181 (E.D.N.Y. 1979).
Treaties between the United States and foreign states may specifically authorize
foreign companies doing business in the United States to engage in some form of
hiring preference for their own citizens. If that intent is expressed in the treaty, the
treaty may be given priority over United States laws regulating national origin
discrimination. See Sumitomo Shoji America, Inc. v. Avagliano, 457 U.S. 176
(1982)(treaty was not applicable because a wholly owned subsidiary of a Japanese
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Excluding all United States nationals most certainly would have
an adverse impact on persons born within the territory of the United
States. Unless the employer could present substantial business reasons
for excluding those of United States origin, the practice would violate
Title VII. Even if the employer had good, sound reasons for excluding
United States nationals, based on an assumption of language or
cultural knowledge, the rule would perhaps be overly inclusive in
that some Americans may have the requisite knowledge. Thus, the
plaintiff could present a lesser discriminatory alternative to the blanket
exclusionary rule to demonstrate that the rule is unnecessary and
invalid."
G. A Note on Security Clearances: 703(g)
Employers engaged in military or security work for the United
States government may be prohibited by federal law from employing
anyone who has not obtained the requisite security clearance from
the federal government. Obviously, the mere requirement that em-
ployees possess security credentials does not constitute a facial dis-
crimination on the basis of national origin. Just as obviously, however,
security requirements adversely affect opportunities for those whose
origins are from nations traditionally hostile to the United States
(e.g., the Soviet Union, Cuba, the People's Republic of China, etc.),
who will find it difficult to receive the necessary clearance. Not-
withstanding this impact, the employer is under no obligation to
present evidence of the "business necessity" of the security require-
ment. Section 703(g) of the Act provides an express "security" de-
fense."
corporation incorporated in the U.S. was not a "company of Japan" covered by
the treaty); McNamara v. Korean Air Lines, 863 F.2d 1135 (3rd Cir. 1988) (treaty
granting Korean Company the right to select executives "of their choice" allowed
preference for Korean nationals, but did not authorize race discrimination). See also,
Wickes v. Olympic Airways, 745 F.2d 363 (6th Cir. 1984).
11 Espinoza v. Farah Mfg. Co., 414 U.S. 86 (1973), specifically indicated that a
claim would lie if an alienage disqualification adversely affected a particular national
origin, but found that since 97%o of the employees were of Mexican origin, a rule
requiring citizenship had no impact on those having Mexican ethnic origins. See
Chaiffetz v. Robertson Research Holding, Ltd., 798 F.2d 731 (5th Cir. 1986).
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(g)(1981).
Notwithstanding any other provision of this title, it shall not be an unlawful
employment practice for an employer to fail or refuse to hire and employ
any individual for any position . . . if -
(1) the occupancy of such position, or access to the premises in or upon
which any part of the duties of such position is performed or is to be
1990]
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IV: THE RECONSTRUCTION ERA CivIL RIGHTS ACT
(42 U.S.C. 1981).
A. Historical Introduction
Immediately following the American Civil War, Congress enacted
a series of sweeping civil rights statutes. The Act of 1866 in part
provides: "All persons ... shall have the same right . . . to make
and enforce contracts . . .as is enjoyed by white citizens." 5 9 It was
assumed for nearly 100 years that this statute required some form
of governmental action. In effect, only governmental action inter-
fering with the right to contract was subject to the Act. In 1971 the
Supreme Court reversed this assumption by holding that the 1866
Act covered purely private, individual acts of discrimination against
persons in the making or termination of contracts; state action was
not required. 60 The Court also concluded that the employment re-
lationship, including hire and termination, was a "contract" within
the language of the 1866 Act. 6' Recently, however, the Supreme Court
limited the scope of section 1981 to situations where a contract was
being denied, and held that mere harassment of an employee because
of her race did not state a section 1981 claim. 62
B. Protection: "'Race"
The history and language of the 1866 Act clearly indicate that it
proscribed racial discrimination. 63 Some authority in the 1970s gave
a literal interpretation to the statute and concluded that the grant of
contract rights to "all persons" prohibited contract discrimination
performed, is subject to any requirement imposed in the interest of the
national security of the United States under any security program in effect
or administered under any statute of the United States or any Executive
order of the President; and
(2) such individual has not fullfilled or has ceased to fulfill that require-
ment.
19 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1982).
60 Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88 (1971). This decision was largely preor-
dained by the Court's decision in Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409
(1968), which held that a companion provision in the same 1866 Act (42 U.S.C. §
1982 (1982)) did not require governmental action.
61 McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273 (1976) [generally
followed lower court construction of the Act]. See, e.g., Waters v. Wisconsin Steel
Works of Int'l Harvester Co., 427 F.2d 476 (7th Cir. 1970). No formal or written
contract of employment was required. The relationship itself was sufficiently con-
tractual to trigger the statute. Id.
61 Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 109 S. Ct. 2363 (1989).
63 Id.
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on the basis of alienage. 4 This authority has now been overruled
based on a rereading of the legislative history.65 The little authority
that exists on this issue makes it clear that the 1866 Act regulates
only racial discrimination, and, thus, does not protect against citi-
zenship or alienage discrimination."
National origin discrimination is not within the protections of the
Act either. 67 Therefore, a difficult distinction is drawn between race
discrimination, which is prohibited, and national origin discrimina-
tion, which is not. For example, is discrimination against Hispanics
racial, and thus protected, or national origin discrimination that is
unprotected? 61 Is discrimination against Jews religious or racial?69
These distinctions, which once plagued the courts, were made much
easier to draw by the Supreme Court's broad construction of the
term "race" in the companion cases of Saint Francis College v. Al-
KhazrajP and Shaare Tefila Congregation v. Cobb.71 In Saint Francis
College it was argued that discrimination against a person of middle-
eastern heritage was not "race," but a form of national origin
discrimination. Similarly, Shaare Tefila Congregation addressed the
argument that discrimination against Jews was either religious or
national origin discrimination, but was not discrimination based on
"race" within the scope of the 1866 Act. In both cases the Court
appeared to confirm that the Act would not reach purely national
origin, citizenship, or religious discrimination, but broadly defined
64 Guerra v. Manchester Terminal Corp., 498 F.2d 641 (5th Cir. 1974).
65 Bhandari v. First Nat'l Bank of Commerce, 829 F.2d 1343 (5th Cir. 1987)(en
banc).
6 Id. Accord, De Malherbe v. Int'l Union of Elevator Constructors, 438 F.Supp.
1121 (N.D.Cal. 1977).
67 See Shah v. Mount Zion Hospital & Medical Center, 642 F.2d 268 (9th Cir.
1981); Anooya v. Hilton Hotels Corp., 733 F.2d 48 (7th Cir. 1984).
68 See Manzanares v. Safeway Stores, 593 F.2d 968 (10th Cir. 1979)(racial).
Although both classes are protected by Title VII, the protection of the 1866 Act is
important for two reasons. First, the complex procedures and limited time for filing
claims under Title VII are not applicable to the 1866 Act. There are no procedural
prerequisites and the time for filing suit is determined by the most appropriate state
statute of limitation. Goodman v. Lukens Steel Co., 482 U.S. 656 (1987). Second,
Title VII does not provide for compensatory or punitive damages. The 1866 Act
allows for recovery of these "tort-like" damages. Johnson v. Railway Express
Agency, 421 U.S. 454 (1975).
69 See Wald v. Teamsters, Local 357, 24 FEP Cases 616, 25 EPD Para. 31,497
(C.D.Cal. 1980).
7o 481 U.S. 604 (1987).
7- 481 U.S. 615 (1987).
1990]
GA. J. INT'L & CoMP. L.
the term "race" to protect discrimination on the basis of distinct
ethnic heritage.
The Court rejected the modern "scientific" division of race into
broad caterories of Caucasoid, Mongoloid, and Negroid, but held
that "race" should be given the meaning that Congress gave it in
1866 when it enacted the statute. Thus, the Court consulted diction-
aries and the literature of the mid-Nineteenth Century for the defi-
nition of "race" and concluded that all ethnic groups such as Basques,
gypsies, and Jews were considered to be distinct "races". Moreover,
the court even found that groupings that we now think of as na-
tionalities were considered separate races. These included the "English
race," the "German race," the "Spanish race," etc. They were
distinct races, not because of any distinctive physiognomy, but because
of their identifiable and distinct ethnic heritage, which Congress in
1866 considered to be racial. In Saint Francis College, the Court
concluded:
Congress intended to protect from discrimination identifiable classes
of persons who are subjected to intentional discrimination solely
because of their ancestry or ethnic characteristics. Such discrimi-
nation is racial discrimination that Congress intended section 1981
to forbid, whether or not it would be classified as racial in terms
of modern scientific theory ... If [plaintiff] can prove that he was
subjected to intentional discrimination based on the fact that he
was born an Arab, rather than solely on the place or nation of his
origin, or his religion, he will have made out a case under section
1981.72
The Court applied this standard in Share Tefila Congregation, and
concluded that harassment of Jews constituted a "racial" conspiracy
within the protection of the 1866 Act.73
In his concurring opinion in Saint Francis College, Justice Brennan
noted that the "line between discrimination based on 'ancestry or
ethnic characteristics,' and discrimination based on 'place or nation
of... origin' is not a bright one. ... Often... the two are identical
as a factual matter: one was born in the nation whose primary stock
is one's own ethnic group." 71
72 Saint Francis College v. Al-Khazraji, 481 U.S. 604, 613 (1987).
71 Shaare Tefila Congregation v. Cobb, 481 U.S. 615 (1987). In this case the
issue was not employment discrimination but vandalism of a house of worship that
was made actionable by another section of the 1866 Act.
74 Saint Francis College v. Al Khazraji, 481 U.S. 604, 614 (1987).
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To illustrate this difficulty, discrimination against one because she
is non-Christian is religious discrimination and not actionable under
the 1866 Act. Discrimination against her because she is Jewish, or
because she is an Arab, or Iranian Persian (and thus perhaps a
Muslim) would be "racial" and thus actionable. Discrimination against
a person because he comes from the Union of South Africa would
be non-actionable national origin discrimination. Discrimination against
him because he is of Dutch-Afrikaner heritage presumably is "racial."
Such fine distinctions will require careful pleading, particularly since
Title VII does not distinguish between race and national origin, but
protects both. 75
V. THE IMMIGRATION REFORM AND CONTROL ACT OF 1986.
A. Historical Background: Why the Legislation?
An irony of American immigration law prior to 1986 was that
while it was illegal for an alien not authorized to work in the United
States to secure employment, it was not illegal for an employer to
hire illegal aliens. 76 This resulted in an economic "pull" into the
United States of readily available employment, with only minimal
legal risks to the illegal alien. 77 In an attempt to stem the flood of
illegal entry, the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 78
imposed civil penalties on employers for hiring or recruiting aliens
not authorized to work in the United States, and for failing to verify
each employee's eligibility for employment. The idea was that if aliens
were not hired in the United States because employers feared statutory
sanctions, the economic "pull" of illegal entry would be reduced.
Civil rights groups, particularly those representing Hispanic inter-
ests, generally opposed the employer sanction approach to immigra-
tion reform on the grounds that employers might avoid the sanctions
71 For example, a plaintiff bringing both a Title VII claim and an 1866 Act claim
based on his Greek heritage would need to allege national origin discriminaton within
the meaning of Title VII and racial discrimination within the meaning of the 1866
Act.
76 8 U.S.C. §1324(a)(3)(1982). See Cohodas, Congress Clears Overhaul of Im-
migration Law, 44 CONG. Q. 2595 (Oct. 18, 1986).
71 Simpson, Immigration Reform and Control, 34 LAB. L. J. 195 (1983); Comment,
The Anti-Discrimination Provisions of the Immigration Reform and Control Act,
62 TUL. L. REv. 1059, 1062-63 (1988). Of course, there was also a "push" factor
of economic decline and political turmoil in their native countries. Id.
11 Pub. L. No. 99-603, 100 Stat 3359 (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1324 (Supp. 1987)).
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and problems of documentation by simply refusing to hire any alien,
or any applicant with a non-Anglo name or appearance. 79
As pointed out earlier, it would violate Title VII of the 1964 Civil
Rights Act for an employer to discriminate on the basis of surnames
or "foreign" appearance, 0 forms of "national origin" discrimination,
but it would not violate Title VII for an employer to simply refuse
to hire any non-citizen.8' Therefore, in order to protect the lawful
alien against the potential overreaction of employers, the Immigration
Act proscribed discrimination on the basis of both "national origin"
and "citizenship status." 8 2 When the employer refuses to hire illegal
aliens, or discharges them when he discovers their status, this is not
proscribed citizenship discrimination. At the same time, the employer
cannot, in an overly broad sweep, simply refuse to hire all aliens.
B. Scope of the Act
1. Unauthorized aliens
The face of the statute discloses that the protections accorded to
aliens are relatively limited. First, and quite logically, the statute
specifically provides no protection for the "unauthorized alien. '"83
Thus, even national origin discrimination against illegal aliens is not
protected by this Act.84
2. "Intending Citizens"
All persons legally residing in the United States are protected against
national origin discrimination. But only United States citizens and
19 Comment, supra note 77, at 1069 and 1073-74. For a good summary of the
legislative history see N. MONTWIELER, THE IMMIGRATION REFORM LAW OF 1986 3-
22 (BNA 1987) [hereinafter MONTWIELER].
10 See supra, notes 42-44 and accompanying text.
R1 Espinoza v. Farah Mfg. Co., 414 U.S. 86 (1973).
12 It is an unfair immigration-related employment practice for a person or other
entity to discriminate against any individual (other than an unauthorized alien) with
respect to hiring, or recruitment or referral for a fee, for the individual for em-
ployment or the discharge of the individual from employment
(A) because of such individual's national origin,
(B) in the case of a citizen or intending citizen (as defined in paragraph
(3)), because of such individual's citizenship status.
8 U.S.C. § 1324b(a)(1) (Supp. 1987).
83 Id.
1, Does this suggest that national origin discrimination against an unlawful alien
has also been excluded from the protections of Title VII? Note that the Supreme
Court has held that the protections of the National Labor Relations Act are applicable
to illegal aliens. Sure-Tan, Inc. v. NLRB, 467 U.S. 883 (1984). See also, Patel v.
Quality Inn, 846 F.2d 700, 702-05 (lth Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 1120
(1988). (The Fair Labor Standards Act held to apply to illegal aliens).
[Vol. 20:29
COMPARATIVE LABOR ROUNDTABLE
"intending citizens" are protected against citizenship discrimination."5
Thus, by protecting United States citizens against discrimination, but
not aliens, the Immigration Act closes a potential gap in Title VII.
"Intending citizens" are given the same protection as "citizens",
but the former has a narrow and parochial definition. "Intending
citizen" does not include all residents who have a subjective desire
to become United States citizens. An "intending citizen" must first
fall into one of four categories of lawful domicile: (i) lawful admission
into the United States as a permanent resident, (ii) temporary residency
under the amnesty provisions of this Act, (iii) a refugee, or (iv) an
asylee.
86
If the alien falls into one of these categories of legal domicile, the
alien must also evidence an intent to become a citizen of the United
States through formal completion of a declaration of intention filed
with the Immigration Service. 7 Moreover, the Act creates stringent
time limitations that define whether the person will be considered
"intending" to become a citizen. The idea is that if a person does
not promptly seek citizenship, or, after promptly seeking, does not
pursue the goal of citizenship, that person is not an "intending
citizen" entitled to the protections against citizenship discrimination.
The alien must apply for naturalization within six months of the date
of becoming a permanent resident. 8 During this six month period,
the alien is protected against citizenship discrimination. Even if the
alien makes a timely application for citizenship, (s)he will not be
considered an "intending citizen" if (s)he has not been naturalized
as a citizen within two years after application. 9 Thus, if a lawfully
admitted alien neglects to file a formal citizenship application within
85 See 8 U.S.C. § 1324b(a)(3)(Supp. 1987).
86 Section 274B(3). The term "citizen or intending citizen" means an individual
who -
(a) is a citizen or national of the United States or
(b) is an alien who -
(i) is lawfully admitted for permanent residence, is granted status for temporary
residence under section 1255a(a)(1) [guest worker provisions of the Act], is admitted
as a refugee under section 1157, or is granted asylum under section 1158, including
lawfully admitted persons of permanent residence and asylees who have indicated a
formal intent to become citizens of the United States.
87 8 U.S.C. § 1324b(3)(B)(ii). See 28 C.F.R. § 44.101(c)(2)(ii)(1989), which requires
the filing of INS Form N-315 or 1-772..
88 A lawful, permanent resident alien will become eligible for citizenship after
five years of permanent residence in the United States. 8 U.S.C. § 1427(a)(1982).
89 Id. Time consumed by the INS in processing the application shall not be
counted toward the two year period. Id.
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six months of eligibility, the employer may use alienage as a basis
of discrimination even if that person is legally entitled to seek em-
ployment in the United States.90
Similarly, an alien that promptly files for naturalization upon
becoming eligible will be protected against alienage discrimination,
but only for two more years. If the alien fails to become naturalized
within that time, (s)he will lose the protection against citizenship
discrimination; that is, employers may refuse to hire, or may dis-
charge, the alien based on that alienage. 91
3. Citizenship "Preference"
The Act specifically provides that it is lawful "to prefer to hire,
recruit, or refer an individual who is a citizen or national of the
United States over another individual who is an alien if the two
individuals are equally qualified. ' 92 Thus, in theory, United States
citizenship can be a "tiebreaker" between otherwise equally qualified
applicants. In reality, this may authorize or encourage subtle dis-
crimination against the alien.
C. Exclusions and Exemptions
1. Small Employers
Employers of three or fewer employees are not subject to the non-
discrimination provisions, even though they may be subject to the
prohibitions on hiring undocumented aliens.93 Title VII covers only
employers of at least 15 employees.9 Thus, at least as concerns
national origin discrimination, the Immigration Act expands protec-
tion to groups of between three and fifteen employees.
2. Title VII Coverage
National origin discrimination covered by Title VII is not subject
to the Immigration Act. 95 Thus, for those employers of fifteen or
90 It is unclear whether an alien will be protected once the declaration of intent
is filed, or having failed to promptly file the declaration upon becoming eligible,
the alien will be protected against citizenship discrimination only upon nationalization.
91 As long as the alien is authorized to work in the United States, the alien
continues to be able to claim protection against national origin discrimination, but
the employer is free to discharge the alien based on lack of citizenship.
92 8 U.S.C. § 1324b(a)(4).
93 8 U.S.C. § 1324b(a)(2)(A).
94 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b).
95 8 U.S.C. § 1324b(a)(2)(B).
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more employees, Title VII, and its provision for national origin being
a "bona fide occupational qualification," 96 is the sole remedy for
national origin discrimination.
3. Law, Regulation, Executive Order, Government Contracts
As previously discussed, federal and state law often require citi-
zenship as a condition of employment. 9 The Immigration Act allows
those laws to provide an override to the prohibitions against citizen-
ship discrimination,98 provided that such laws are otherwise consti-
tutional. 99 On the other hand, if a decision-maker ultra vires decided
to use citizenship as a basis for employment, without the authorization
of law, presumably that action would be subject to the Act.
Moreover, if laws specifically authorize private employers to use
citizenship as a basis for hiring, such laws are given a priority over
the Act. Likewise, citizenship requirements imposed on private em-
ployers by virtue of a government contract will not fall within the
prohibitions of the Act. 100 Finally, the Attorney General is authorized
to grant to employers the power to make citizenship distinctions as
a condition of doing business with any agency of a federal, state,
or local government.' 10
4. "With Respect to Hiring, or Recruitment, . . . or the
Discharge .... ""
Title VII uses sweeping language to prohibit discrimination in
virtually all aspects of the employment relationship - "compensation,
terms, conditions, or privileges of employment"' 0 2 - or "to limit,
segregate, or classify .. . in any way which would deprive or tend
to deprive any individual of employment opportunities or otherwise
adversely affect his status as an employee."' 03 By contrast, the Im-
96' 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e). This leaves the question of whether national origin
will ever be a bona fide occupational qualification for those employers subject only
to the Immigration Act, those of between four and fifteen employees.
11 See supra notes 16-23 and accompanying text.
" 8 U.S.C. § 1324b(a)(2)(C).
Of course, to the extent laws excluding aliens are unconstitutional, they would
be null and void. The statutory exemption for legislative or contractual preferences
for citizens, or the disqualification of aliens, would not be applied, and the basic
provisions precluding citizenship discrimination would be applied.
8 U.S.C. § 1324b(a)(2)(C).
10, Id.
102 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(l)(1982).
.03 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(2)(1982).
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migration Reform Act is more narrow. It is illegal "to discriminate
with respect to hiring, or recruitment, or referral for a fee, . . or
the discharge of the individual from employment . . . "104 Noticeably
absent from the language of the Immigration Act are prohibitions
against compensation discrimination. Presumably, therefore, while an
employer may not reject qualified "intending citizens" who applied
for work on the basis of their alienage, the employer is free to pay
aliens less than citizens.
Moreover, it is a clear violation of Title VII for an employer to
segregate its work force along ethnic lines or to harass workers on
the basis of ethnic origin by giving them more onerous assignments
or by subjecting them to jokes, insults, or ethnic slurs. 105 It is not
so clear whether such treatment of protected "intending citizens"
violates the Immigration Act.' °6
C. Impact of Neutral Devices on National Origin and
Citizenship.
Title VII will subject neutral devices which adversely affect a pro-
tected class to a scrutiny which tests the "business necessity" of such
a device.107 Conversely, the 1866 Civil Rights Act is violated only by
actions proved to have been motivated by considerations of "race;'" 0 8
mere impact upon a particular "race" is insufficient to establish
liability under that Act.)°
The unresolved question is whether the Immigration Act is violated
only by a plaintiff proving a citizenship or national origin motivation
10 8 U.S.C. § 1324b(a)(1)(1988).
105 See Cariddi v. Kansas City Chiefs Football Club, Inc., 568 F.2d 87 (8th Cir.
1977); Rogers v EEOC, 454 F.2d 234 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 957
(1972). Cf. Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 109 S. Ct. 2363 (1989) (such ha-
rassment will not violate 42 U.S.C. § 1981).
-0 While such harassment standing alone may not be illegal, if the employee is
forced to leave the job because of the treatment he receives, in all likelihood such
a resignation would be deemed a "constructive discharge" by the employer. See
Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897 (11th Cir. 1982); Goss v. Exxon Office
Sys. Co., 747 F.2d 885 (3d Cir. 1984); Holsey v. Armour & Co., 743 F.2d 199 (4th
Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1028 (1985). See generally, Player, supra note 29,
sec. 5.47, for a summary of the constructive discharge concept. Plaintiff may have
to prove that the harassment, which was not on its face illegal, was done for the
purpose of causing the employee to resign, and the reason why the employer wanted
the employee to resign was because of the employee's alienage. Id.
107 See supra notes 35-38 and accompanying text.
,01 "Race" is defined broadly to include virtually all ethnic origins. See supra
notes 68-73 and accompanying text.
-0 General Bldg. Contractors Ass'n v. Pennsylvania, 458 U.S. 375 (1982).
[Vol. 20:29
COMPARATIVE LABoR ROUNDTABLE
for the employment decision, or whether ostensibly neutral devices
adversely affecting persons of certain nationality or national origin
can also violate the Act. For example, does a rule requiring English
to be spoken by the employee, or prohibiting languages other than
English to be spoken on the premises, violate the Immigration Act?
Such rules are not facially drawn along origin lines, but they probably
can be shown to adversely affect aliens and those citizens whose
origins are non-Anglo. If the Immigration Act feaches only intentional
discrimination, the plaintiff would have the considerable burden of
proving some form of bad faith or animus in the defendant's adoption
or enforcement of the rules. On the other hand, if the Immigration
Act finds violations premised upon adverse impact, there may be an
insufficient relationship between such rules and job requirements to
meet even a relaxed form of "necessity."
In signing the Act, President Reagan indicated that the Act reached
only intentional discrimination, and did not reach practices which
only adversely affected employment of aliens or persons of non-Anglo
heritage.110 As would be expected, the Interpretations subsequently
issued by President Reagan's Attorney General similarly construe the
Act."' The Act itself did not so qualify the phrase "to discriminate"
with the adverb "intentionally" which was inserted by the executive
1,0 Statement by the President, 22 Weekly Comp. Pres. Doc. 1534, 1535 (Nov. 6,
1986), reprinted in MONTWIELER, supra note 79, at 537-43.
[A] facially neutral employee selection practice that is employed without
discriminatory intent will be permissible under the provisions of [the Act].
For example, the section does not preclude a requirement of English language
skill or a minimum score on an aptitude test even if the employer cannot
show a "manifest relationship to the job in question" or that the requirement
is a "bona fide occupational qualification reasonably necessary to the normal
operation of that particular business or enterprise," so long as the practice
is not a guise used to discriminate on account of national origin or citizenship
status. Indeed, unless the plaintiff presents evidence that the employer has
intentionally discriminated on proscribed grounds, the employer need not
offer any explanation for his employee selection procedures. Id.
For a discussion of this statement and the amount of judicial deference that should
be accorded thereto, see Comment, Judicial Deference to the Chief Executive's
Interpretation of the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 Antidiscrimination
Provision: A Circumvention of Constitutionally Prescribed Legislative Procedure,
41 U. M1MIn L. REv. 1057 (1987).
"1 28 C.F.R. § 44.200(a)(1989). "It is an unfair immigration-related employment
practice for a person or other entity to knowingly and intentionally discriminate or
engage in a pattern of (sic) practice of knowing and intentional discrimination."
Id. (emphasis added).
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department." 2 Moreover, no clear legislative history supports such
an addition." 3 Nonetheless, the sweeping language of Title VII, broadly
prohibiting all "classifications" which "in any way tend to deprive
individuals of employment opportunities," prompted the Supreme
Court to conclude that Title VII reached neutral practices adversely
affecting employment opportunities of protected classes., 4 When such
broad language is absent the Supreme Court has tended not to use
impact as a premise of liability." 5 As pointed out above, not only
does the Immigration Act lack the sweeping regulation of "classi-
fications" which "tend to deprive individuals of employment op-
portunities," it is decidedly narrow in the types of activity that it
does regulate." 6 It remains for the judiciary to resolve whether it will
112 In the provisions outlining the powers of the Special Counsel (the entity created
by the Act to enforce the nondiscrimination provisions) the Act indicates that a
charge should allege "knowing and intentional discriminatory activity or a pattern
or practice of discriminatory activity". Section 274b(d)(2). First, this provision
describes only the role of the Special Counsel; it does not articulate a standard of
liability. The standard of liability is found in subparagraph (g) of the Act, which
provides only that to order a remedy the administrative law judge must find that
"any person or entity named in the complaint has engaged in or is engaging in any
such unfair immigration-related employment practice." Note that the qualifier "in-
tentional" is not present. (But perhaps "such" refers back to the descriptive "in-
tentional" found in subparagraph (d)).
Second, subparagraph (d) allows liability to be established by proof of a "pattern
or practice of discriminatory activity". Even if the disjunctive "or" can be said to
qualify the standard of liability, the standard is free from any "intentional" qual-
ification.
Finally, the terms "knowing and "intentional" are themselves ambiguous. They
do not necessarily mean that the defendant was motivated by considerations made
illegal by the Act. They could mean nothing more than intentionally doing the act
which is illegal. Title VII has "intentionally" language similar to that found in
subparagraph (d) of the Immigration Act. See, 42 U.S.C. § 2000-5(g). Yet, the
Supreme Court has given "intentionally" a very limited construction, meaning no
more than the defendant knowingly, as opposed to accidentally, engaged in the
action upon which liability was based. "Intentionally" did not import into liability
an element that the defendant must have been moved to action because of the
particular class membership of the plaintiff. Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422
U.S. 405 (1975); Franks v. Bowman Transportation Co., 424 U.S. 747 (1976).
"I See Comment, supra note 77, at 1101-04.
114 See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971); Connecticut v. Teal, 457
U.S. 440 (1982).
"I General Bldg. Contractors Ass'n v. Pennsylvania, 458 U.S. 375 (1982) (42
U.S.C. § 1981); Personnel Adm'r v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256 (1979) (construing the
Fourteenth Amendment). See also, Guardian's Ass'n v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 463
U.S. 582 (1983), which emphasized the importance of statutory language and history
in determining the role of impact in construing Title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights
Act.
116 See supra notes 81-90 and accompanying text.
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accept the construction offered by the executive or whether it will
recognize a broader purpose to the Act, and to construe it in a way
that reaches a result similar to that reached under Title VII. 1
7
VI. CONCLUSION
The law protecting against employment discrimination based on
national origin, ethnic origin, and alienage is not clean and well-
defined. It could be described as a patchwork that fails to cover all
the holes.
The Constitution places considerable limits on the ability of gov-
ernments to use ethnic origin as a qualification, but relatively minor
restrictions on governmental use of alienage qualifications. Title VII
broadly protects against national origin classifications under the same
standards as applied to race and gender classifications, but in a rather
glaring gap provides only limited protection to alienage classifications.
The 1866 Civil Rights Act at one time was thought to protect aliens
in their right to make and enforce contracts the same as "white
citizens," but recent decisions have undercut such a construction.
The Act does, however, protect against intentional discrimination
because of race, which has been broadly construed to include virtually
all ethnic origins (or "race" in the lexicon of the 19th Century). The
Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 protects against citi-
zenship discrimination, but only of citizens and a relatively confined
group of legal residents who can be defined as "intending citizens."
Even this discrimination is limited to intentional discrimination in
hiring and discharge, leaving unprotected compensation and employ-
ment condition discrimination.
Perhaps this protection is better than none. The alien is provided
full protections against sex, race, and national origin discrimination.
But the limited protection the alien receives against being victimized
because of that alienage is far from the Biblical injunction to treat
the alien who "settles with you in your land as a man like yourself."
"I See Note, Standard of Proof in § 274B of the Immigration Reform and Control
Act of 1986, 41 VAND. L. REv. 1323 (1988). Since the alleged victim has a private
right to file a charge before an administrative law judge, (2) and (h), thus commencing
a process that will ultimately culminate in judicial review, the mere refusal of the
Special Counsel to process a complaint that did not allege "intentional" discrimi-
nation would not preclude litigation of that issue. Id.
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